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ABSTRACT
Economists emphasize the benefits from free trade due to international specialization, but typically
have a narrow measure of what matters to individuals. Critics of free trade, by contrast, focus on the
pattern of consumption in society and the nature of goods being consumed, but often fail to take into
account the gains from specialization. This paper develops a new framework to study the effects of
trade liberalization on cultural identity, which emerges as the result of the interaction of individual
consumption choices, similar to a network externality. In a Ricardian model of international trade
the paper shows that (i) trade is not Pareto inferior to autarky if the free trade equilibrium is unique,
(ii) trade is not Pareto superior to autarky if the world is culturally diverse under free trade, but can
be if the world is culturally homogenous, (iii) and when multiple free trade equilibria exist
everybody in a country can lose from free trade if that country is culturally homogenous under
autarky. Consumers of imported cultural goods tend to gain, while consumers of exported cultural
goods tend to lose from trade liberalization.
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To most economists the bene…ts from international trade and the globalization process are
clear and signi…cant. Consumers gain when countries specialize according to their com-
parative advantage and factors ‡ow to their most productive use. The general public and
many politicians are often more skeptical. The doubts are not constrained to non-academics
however. A casual look at other social sciences like sociology and political science, or more
generally the humanities, shows deep concerns over globalization and trade liberalization.1
Even super…cial examination of the related literatures reveals an interesting, if little ac-
knowledged fact. Economists and their critics seem to speak about di¤erent phenomena,
even though they both refer to globalization.2
For economists globalization and trade liberalization are good because physical output
increases as the result of international specialization, which in turn enlarges the consump-
tion set and hence makes individuals better o¤. By contrast, many critics are not so much
concerned about the quantity of physical goods being consumed. Rather they fear that the
globalization process erodes national cultures and individual identities. From that stand-
point, the increase in physical consumption of mass produced goods of western origin like
McDonalds hamburgers, Hollywood movies, and pop music, is seen as negative because it
crowds out self-produced or locally manufactured goods. Traditional life-styles vanish.3 This
argument is popular both in many developing countries and in industrialized countries like
France. Whereas economists do not attach any value per se to consuming locally produced
goods, this is an essential part for the survival of national or regional cultures, according
to the critics’ view. To risk oversimpli…cation, one might say that economists do not care
about what is consumed, but about how much, whereas many globalization critics care about
1It is impossible to give an overview of the literature in other social sciences. Three books comprising
articles from various authors may give an indication however; Lamberton (2002), Chan and McIntyre (2002),
and McAnany and Wilkinson (1996).
2A simple search on www.jstor.org con…rms the point. A full-text simultaneous search for the terms
”globalization” and ”culture” produces 15 hits among 22 economics journals for the entire period, but 145
hits in 86 journals in Anthropolgy, Language and Literature, and Sociology for the 1990-1995 period alone.
3For a sociology perspective on this see Castells (1997). The following quote from Akande (2002) expresses
the point very clearly as well. ...globalized ”cultural” industries are taking over traditional forms of creation
and dissemination of culture. Local culture’s role as a spontaneous and integral part of people’s life is eroded
and it ceases to serve as the means of constructing societal values, reproducing group identity and building
social cohesion. The end result becomes global integration at the expense of local disintegration. See also
Tardi¤ (2002).
1society’s pattern of consumption, and rank the amount of consumption as second order.
Economists may react to this observation in several ways. One response is to dismiss
most of the globalization critics’ arguments as many of their academic studies lack the rigor
of a theoretical model and the systematic evidence that economists derive from econometric
studies.4 Another response might be to view the di¤erent approaches by economists and
non-economists as an e¢cient process of specialization in itself. Let economists worry about
the gains from trade, while the humanities deal with cultural aspects. This paper takes
a third approach by taking the critics’ views seriously for two reasons. First, economists
cannot win the debate over globalization without properly responding to the concerns of
globalization critics - even if the arguments are often not well formulated.5 The second
reason is that cultural aspects do matter in real life to most people. Economists often
hesitate to incorporate cultural aspects, perhaps because of the di¢culty in how to capture
it both theoretically and empirically.6 The third approach turns out to be useful as it leads
to novel insights about the gains from trade and the identity of gainers and losers from trade
liberalization.
The key innovation of the paper is to formalize the notion of cultural identity and incorpo-
rate it into a Ricardian model of international trade. To this end, I adapt the formalization of
identity as introduced by Akerlof and Kranton (2000), who show that the notion of identity
can explain many labor and other market phenomena better than traditional models. They
do not consider aspects of international trade. For the present paper, individual identity is
a function that involves an individual’s own and all other individuals’ consumption choices.
I ignore the process of identi…cation which is the term used by psychologists to describe the
assertion of one own’s norm if other violate the norm (I return to this issue in section 5).
The present identity function therefore works like a network externality.7 Individuals must
choose between consuming either one of two cultural goods. The loss in identity is zero if all
4For example, a typical weakness of globalization critics’ argument is that it does not refute the economist’s
argument of revealed preference. If consumers around the world choose to eat popcorn while watching
a Hollywood movie, the observation suggests prima facie that consumers must be better o¤ than when
consuming a local movie and traditional food.
5This is in line with a recent paper by Paul Segerstrom (2003), who examines the arguments of globaliza-
tion critic Naomi Klein. In the cultural context Cowen (2002) provides anecdotal evidence for the bene…ts
of globalization and the survival of indigenous cultures.
6An exception is the paper by Lazear (1999) who analyzes the role of language and cultural assimilation.
7The idea of network externalities within an industrial organization context goes back to Katz and Shapiro
(1985).
2individuals within a country consume the same cultural good (called cultural homogeneity).
An example may illustrate my approach. Often people perceive certain consumption behav-
ior with a speci…c country: The French drink wine, while Germans drink beer. Similarly,
viewing the same movie (or, more generally, the same art exhibition, theatre performance,
etc.) creates a bond among people because it allows them to talk about a common expe-
rience. Yet people di¤er in their taste for cultural goods and thus may consume the other
cultural good (which leads to cultural diversity), i.e. some French drink beer. The degree
of non-conforming behavior depends on the di¤erence in prices of the cultural goods as well
as the social punishment, perhaps expressed as disrespect by others and leading to feeling
of shame by the non-conforming individual. Trade liberalization changes the relative price
of cultural goods, which in turn drives social consumption behavior and therefore indirectly
also the amount of social punishment, as the latter is a function of how many people conform
to the norm.
Incorporating the above notion of identity in a model of international trade based on
technological di¤erences allows me to analyze when and why the argument for open borders
is strong. Recall that in a standard Ricardian model free trade is always (weakly) Pareto
improving relative to autarky as countries specialize according to their comparative advan-
tage. Consistent with this framework all results are derived under the assumptions of perfect
competition, constant returns to scale, and in addition identical factor endowments. The
…rst main result of this paper proves that in the presence of cultural identity trade is not
Pareto inferior to autarky if the free trade equilibrium is unique. While changes in a society’s
pattern of consumption due to trade liberalization have the potential to make an individual
worse o¤, there are some individuals who are better o¤ either from the traditional gains
from trade due to e¢cient specialization, or from a favorable shift in consumption pattern,
or from both. This is true regardless of whether the country is culturally homogenous or
diverse before and after opening borders, as long as there are not multiple equilibria (more
on this below).
The second main result shows whether and when trade liberalization is Pareto improving:
When the world is culturally diverse under free trade, trade is not Pareto superior to autarky.
To understand this result note that cultural diversity is a double-edged sword. On the one
hand it indicates that the distribution of tastes for di¤erent cultural goods is su¢ciently
3wide relative to the price di¤erence of the goods. On the other hand, the diversity in
consumption choices implies a loss in identity. Under free trade the identity loss e¤ect
becomes more prominent for some individuals who continue to consume the same cultural
good after borders open up. Yet, trade can be Pareto superior to autarky. This happens
when the world is culturally homogenous under free trade, thereby eliminating the losses in
cultural identity. Trade is not always Pareto superior, however, because cultural homogeneity
comes at a price. Individuals with strong taste preference for one cultural good may …nd it
advantageous to give up the consumption of their favored good if the rest of society prefers
the other, but would have been better o¤ under autarky, when more individuals conform
with their choice.
The last main result focuses on the welfare e¤ects in a single country. Everybody in a
country can lose when the country is culturally homogenous under autarky. Since the other
country is by assumption more e¢cient in producing the other cultural good, free trade is
consistent with cultural homogeneity in either of the two cultural goods for some parameter
values. When the two equilibria can be ranked in terms of individual welfare for one country,
it is possible that the economy moves from the unique, superior and culturally homogenous
equilibrium under autarky to the worse culturally homogenous equilibrium under free trade.
Note that this can occur only if the distribution of tastes is small relative to the loss of identity
if an individual deviates from the social norm. The above case also opens up the possibility
that trade is Pareto inferior to autarky, which happens if the other country is homogenous
in the same good before and after trade liberalization (and hence those individuals are
indi¤erent between closed and open borders).
Together the results highlight the importance of consumer choices, which is in contrast
to traditional thinking by trade theorists. Economists have known for a long time that trade
liberalization has distributional e¤ects. In a simple Heckscher-Ohlin model a country’s scarce
factor loses from trade liberalization, while the abundant factor gains. By contrast, in the
present context the gainers are those individuals who before and after trade liberalization
consume the cultural good that is imported under free trade because of the favorable shift
in society’s consumption pattern and the traditional gains from trade. The individuals who
consume the export good under free trade lose when the society’s consumption pattern
changes in favor of the imported cultural good. This prediction seems consistent with the
4observation that opponents of trade liberalization are often the consumers of the good that
is domestically produced and exported (e.g., French farmers oppose McDonalds).
The theoretical literature on trade in cultural goods is fairly small, but increasing. Three
papers are close to the present undertaking, although di¤erent at the same time. Francois
and van Ypersele (2002) argue that under certain conditions protection of cultural goods
can be Pareto improving. Using trade in movie pictures as an example, consumers have by
assumption identical valuations for Hollywood produced movies, but di¤er in their valuations
of local, non-Hollywood movies. A key assumption is that individuals are interested only in
the local movies produced in their own country. Since movie production requires spending of
…xed costs, local non-Hollywood movies may be driven out of the market depending on the
taste distribution and …xed costs. A tari¤ on Hollywood movies can be Pareto improving
because it makes local movies viable in both markets. The distribution of preferences plays
an important role in the present model as well. However, unlike Francois and van Ypersele’s
model increasing returns to scale on the producer side do not drive the results here.
In another recent contribution Bala and Van Long (2003) analyze the e¤ects of trade on
cultural diversity. Their model and mechanism of preference interaction is however di¤erent
from mine. Using replicator dynamics, they assume that the number of individuals preferring
one type of good over another depends on the fraction of people having the same preference
in the previous period as well as the relative price of the two goods. Trade may lead to
the extinction of one preference type, depending on the relative endowment of each good
and country size. In contrast to their approach the present paper derives the interaction
of individual behavior more directly by borrowing from a framework that …nds support in
the psychology literature. In addition, the lack of cultural diversity is not driven here by
di¤erences in country size or relative endowments, but rather by di¤erences in technology. I
also provide a complete welfare analysis.
Yet another recent contribution is Suranovic and Winthrop. They explore two ways of
incorporating culture into a Heckscher-Ohlin model to examine the e¤ects of trade liberaliza-
tion. The …rst one gives workers in a particular industry an additional gain beyond the wages
paid. The second version is more similar to the present one by assuming that workers receive
an additional bene…t from society’s consumption of a particular good. Unlike the present
paper, however, there is no taste heterogeneity for di¤erent cultural goods and no possibil-
5ity for individuals to collectively gain when the majority consumes the imported cultural
good. This biases the results against trade liberalization and leads directly to protectionist
arguments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model and
derives some preliminary results that hold both in the closed and open economy. Section
3 provides a characterization of the equilibria under both situations, which is followed in




In this section a simple two-country Ricardian model of international trade is set up. In
contrast to a standard Ricardian model I assume that individuals care about other individ-
uals’ choices, which gives rise to an individual identity function. This is explained in more
detail below. In order to focus on understanding the relationship between trade liberaliza-
tion and identity I abstract from increasing returns to scale and from country asymmetries
other than di¤erences in technology.8 Each country produces three goods x;y; and z, using































where Li;i = x;y;z; is the quantity of labor used in each industry and ai is the unit labor
requirement coe¢cient in Home, and similar for Foreign. An asterisk denotes foreign country
variables. All markets are perfectly competitive.
In each country there is a continuum of consumers of size one. Each individual supplies
one unit of labor inelastically. In what follows I focus on the description of Home. Each
8Some asymmetries are discussed in section 5.
6consumer may purchase good z (the noncultural good) and one unit of either good x or y (the
cultural goods).9 One way to think about this setup is to see goods x and y as di¤erentiated
products in an industry (say beer and wine, or Hollywood movies and locally produced
movies), and each person consumes only one of the two. The unit purchase restriction
simpli…es the analysis and the introduction of individual identity. Good z is a composite
consumption good, comprising all other goods in the economy.
Assume that individual preferences are given by




b + e I ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)I if individual consumes good x
e I ¡ ¸I if individual consumes good y
(2)
where cz is the amount of good z consumed, b is a preference parameter that is uniformly
distributed on [¡b;b] for b > 0: As motivated by Akerlof and Kranton (2000), e I ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)I
is the identity function when the individual buys good x, and e I ¡¸I if the person consumes
good y. The parameter e I is the base identity level that each individual obtains. I assume
that e I is su¢ciently large so that consumption of a cultural good dominates consumption
of the noncultural good only. If this holds, e I plays no further role, as it becomes a constant
in the utility function. Identity is reduced by an amount that depends on the pattern of
consumption in society. Let ¸ 2 [0;1] be the number and thus fraction of society that
consumes good x. If Home’s norm is to consume good x, then individuals who consume
good x su¤er from each individual that deviates from the norm and consumes good y in the
amount of I > 0. Each x consumer’s total loss in identity is (1 ¡ ¸)I: Clearly, when all
individuals consume x, there is no identity loss. Moreover, if a person violates the norm and
consumes good y, then the individual in‡icts an identity loss ¸I onto itself, that is larger
the more individuals consume good x.10 An alternative interpretation of the utility function
9Assumptions introduced later will guarantee that consumption of good z only or the cultural good only
will be dominated by consumption of both types of goods. In this sense cultural good consumption is essential
and a¤ordable.
10Compared to Akerlof and Kranton (2000) the identity function is more complex because there are more
than two individuals. At the same time, I simplify the identity function by assuming that the identity loss
parameter I is the same regardless of whether the person consumes x or y: Akerlof and Kranton allow for
the possibility that when the social norm is to consume x, the loss parameter is Io (o for other) for every
other consumer who consumes good y: Similiarly, when deviating from the norm by consuming y; the loss
parameter is Is (s for self) to indicate the self-in‡icted loss in identity. A priori, there is no restriction on
the relative size of the two parameters. For the present purpose, it is useful to assume that the two are the
same. As mentioned in the introduction, I ignore the process of identi…cation, which psychologists use to
describe the additional actions taken by those whose norms are violated by others to recon…rm their values.
7(2) is to see it as a consumption or network externality.
Let the price of good i be pi; an individual’s budget constraint reads
w = pzcz +
½
px if person buys good x
py if person buys good y (3)
where w is the wage rate and thus income, given the assumption that each person inelastically
supplies one unit of labor.
Before I analyze optimal consumption choices, I introduce the following assumption. The
productivity in cultural goods production is su¢ciently high in both countries such that a
single country could serve world demand if the world population consumes the same cultural
good. Since world population is two, this amounts to assuming (ax;ay,a¤
x;a¤
y) < 1=2: In
equilibrium therefore each country must produce positive levels of the noncultural good.
In addition, the technology assumption ensures that noncultural good consumption must be








because the price ofa cultural good pi can never exceed Home’s production cost in equilibrium
(wai). This completes the description of the model, which is identical to a standard Ricardian
model except for the interdependent consumption behavior.
2.2 Preliminary Results
The equilibrium notion is straightforward. An autarky equilibrium is a vector of industry
labor inputs and outputs fLi=x;y;z;X;Y;Zg; a consumption tuple for each individual, consist-
ing of cz and the variety of the cultural good consumed (x or y); a price vector fpi;wgi=x;y;z;
and a critical value b ¸ such that (i) all national goods markets and the national labor market
clear given prices and b ¸ , (ii) …rms’ input-output choices are feasible and maximize pro…ts
given the price vector, and (iii) individual consumption choices are feasible and maximize
utility taking b ¸ and prices as exogenous. In addition, the following must be true: (iv) the
number of individuals who prefer buying x based on (iii) must equal b ¸: The last condition
is the only true novel aspect compared to a standard Ricardian trade model, and amounts
together with (iii) to a …xed point requirement.
8A free trade equilibrium has the same qualitative structure as the autarky equilibrium,
with the di¤erence that goods markets are integrated, that is, (i’) national labor markets clear
and international markets for cultural and noncultural goods are balanced. Each country
has its own critical value, b ¸ and b ¸
¤
; but because of symmetry of preferences and endowments
the two will coincide, as shown later. In the remainder of this section I derive properties
that both autarky and and free trade equilibria must satisfy, namely conditions (ii) to (iv).
Before solving for the equilibrium, it is useful to introduce a new terminology.
De…nition. A country is called culturally diverse if b ¸ 2 (0;1); and culturally homogenous
in good x(y) if b ¸ = 1 (b ¸ = 0):
Since countries will be symmetric in their consumption pattern under free trade I will use
the same terminology for a free trade situation, that is, the world is called culturally diverse
or homogenous corresponding to the value of ¸:
I start solving the model with condition (ii). Perfect competition and pro…t maximization
imply
pi · wai; i = x;y;z; (4)
where the equality holds when the output in industry i is strictly positive.
Next consider condition (iii) regarding utility maximization. Recall that consumption of
only z is never optimal and cz ¸ 0: The decision which cultural good to consume depends on
the price di¤erence of x and y: I use the following de…nition p ´
py¡px
pz to denote this price
di¤erence in terms of the noncultural good. Using (2) and (3), a person buys x if
b ¸ I(1 ¡ 2¸) ¡ p ´b b(¸;p): (5)
Condition (5) shows that the decision depends on the magnitude of the taste parameter b
relative to I;¸ and price di¤erence p: The critical valueb b; which may be below ¡b or above b;
indicates the individual who is indi¤erent between consuming good x or y; given an arbitrary
consumption pattern in society ¸ and price p: An individual consumes good y when b < b b:
Note that whenb b(¸;p) 2 (¡b;b); the critical value is strictly decreasing in ¸ and p: A crucial
role below plays the sign of the di¤erence b¡I: Note that when b > I the highest valuation
individual for good x buys good x even if no one else does, as long as the price of x is less
than the price of y.
9The individual consumption choice is illustrated in Figure 1 for an individual with pref-
erence parameter b under the assumptions p > maxf0;¡bg: The two lines plot the utility
as function of society’s consumption pattern ¸, given that the consumer either buys x or y:
Obviously, u(x;b) is increasing in ¸, while u(y) is decreasing. The intersection point gives the
critical level of consumption behavior in society which makes the consumer indi¤erent be-
tween the two cultural goods. Values below (above) the critical value lead to strict preference
for good y(x):
An increase in the preference parameter b shifts only the u(x;b) line upwards, and thus
lowers the threshold level and the set of ¸¡values that make the individual prefer good
y. For su¢ciently large values of b no intersection may exist, and hence the individual
prefers good x regardless of what society does (and vice versa for su¢ciently low values of
b). Another parameter in‡uencing individual decision making is the identity loss parameter
I: An increase in I rotates both utility curves downward around the maximum utility point.
The base identity level e I has no in‡uence.
Turning to equilibrium condition (iv), aggregate demand for good x given an arbritrary
consumption pattern in society ¸ equals the sum of all unit demands from those individuals







b ¡ minfb;maxf¡b;b bgg
2b
= ¸; (6)
where I use for notational convenience b b as shortcut for b b(¸;p): For the moment I treat price
p as a parameter. The min and max requirements stem from the fact that demand can
neither exceed one nor become negative. The aggregate demand function can take only a
certain number of shapes, as is illustrated in Figure 2 (and which will be discussed in more
detail below). To see this properties of the aggregate demand function for good x are derived.
When ¡b · b b(¸;p) · b; Xd is increasing in ¸ as @Xd=@¸ = I=b > 0: Otherwise, aggregate
demand is independent of ¸: Since b b(¸;p) is monotone in ¸; aggregate demand is piecewise
linear with at most three segments. If there are three segments, the middle one is increasing
in ¸; and the other two are independent of ¸. In addition, it is useful to have the properties
10of aggregate demand for good x at ¸ = 0 and ¸ = 1;
X




0 if b < I ¡ p
b¡I+p
2b if ¡b · I ¡ p · b








0 if I + p < ¡b
b+I+p
2b if ¡b · I + p · b
1 if b < I + p:
(8)
I now prove the following preliminary result.
Lemma 1. For given price p :










² If minfp;¡pg · b ¡ I · maxfp;¡pg; there exists a unique stable …xed point where
b ¸ =
½
0 if p < 0
1 if p > 0:
² If b¡I < minfp;¡pg; there exist two stable …xed points, b ¸ = 0 and b ¸ = 1: An interior
…xed point exists but is unstable.
Proof: Consider an interior …xed point, which must be a solution ¸ 2 (0;1) to equation (6)
or b ¡b b(¸) = 2b¸: Solving for ¸ gives (9); which is interior if and only if ¡1 <
p
b¡I < 1; or
b ¡ I > maxfp;¡pg:




11The intuition for the stability notion is as follows. Starting from a …xed point, assume that a few
individuls mistakenly buy good y instead of x (or vice versa). When the stability condition holds, however,
aggregate demand is higher than ¸ near the …xed point when a few individuals switch from x to y by mistake,
and thus other individuals will be induced to buy x: This pushes the consumption pattern back to the original
point. By contrast, when the stability condition does not hold, fewer individuals have an incentive to buy
x; which will lead to a corner solution eventually.
11Since the slope of aggregate demand is either 0 or I=b; the interior equilibrium is stable
whenever aggregate demand is independent of ¸ at the …xed point, or when b > I in the
increasing portion of the aggregate demand curve. The former case, @Xd=@¸ = 0, can never
happen for an interior …xed point. To see this, note that it requires either 0 < Xd(¸ = 0) < 1;
or 0 < Xd(¸ = 1) < 1; or both. Since Xd has at most three segments, these conditions are
contradictory because Xd cannot both be dependent on ¸ at ¸ = 0 or ¸ = 1; and be
independent of ¸ in order to have the zero slope (see (7) and (8)).
Next consider corner solutions. From (6), b ¸ = 0 requires that minfmaxf¡b;b bg;bg = b;
which in turn requires b b ¸ b or b ¡ I · ¡p: Similarly, for b ¸ = 1 to be a …xed point,
minfmaxf¡b;b bg;bg = ¡b is needed; which necessitates b ¡ I · p: This means also that
when both b ¸ = 0 and b ¸ = 1 are …xed points, the interior …xed point cannot be stable as
b ¡ I < minfp;¡pg < 0 violates the stability condition (10) because @Xd=@¸ = I=b. The
corner …xed points are stable by de…nition because @Xd=@¸ = 0 at these points. ¥
The aggregate demand curve and …xed points are shown in Figure 2. Panel 2a shows the
unique interior …xed point, which is stable because aggregate demand cuts the 45 degree line
from above. Panel 2b refers to the multiple …xed point case, where only the corner points
are stable. An example for the unique corner case is shown in panel 2c. Panel 2d depicts an
impossible con…guration as aggregate demand cannot be dependent on ¸ at 0 and 1, and at
the same time have a zero slope locally.
Lemma 1 is useful in a number of ways. While multiple …xed points can exist given p,
there are at most two and they are corner solutions. Any interior …xed point is unique.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 The Closed Economy
I now solve for the autarky equilibrium, which requires to pin down the autarky price pA.
Once this price is found, the rest follows from Lemma 1. To this end - and parallel to the
price term de…nition p - the de…nition a ´
ay¡ax
az is used, which describes the productivity
di¤erence in producing the two cultural goods relative to the composite good’s punit labor




waz = a if all goods are produced. The sign of
a; like the sign of p; is not determined a priori. Lemma 1 establishes for any given price p
at most two …xed points. This leaves open the possibility that multiple equilibria in p with
di¤erent consumption pattern could exist, that is, …xed points ¸
0 6= ¸
00 exist corresponding
to two price terms p0 6= p00: In addition, if one cultural good is not produced, price p is not
uniquely determined, as (4) does not have to hold with equality. As it turns out, however,
all these concerns about multiplicity and indeterminancy are not justi…ed. Nothing is lost
by assuming that the autarky price always equals a: If for this price two corner equilibria
exist according to Lemma 1, a di¤erent price leads to …xed points that must also be corner
equilibria in terms of ¸. Moreover, if for such a price a unique interior …xed point exist, then
there cannot exist another price such that a corner equilibrium emerges as …xed point.
Lemma 2. Suppose there exists an autarky equilibrium which is unique given equilibrium
price p: Then there does not exist another equilibrium price p0 6= p which has a unique …xed
point and a di¤erent consumption pattern.
Proof: First, there cannot be two di¤erent interior equilibria because an interior equilibrium
requires p = a: Consider next a corner equilibrium, say ¸ = 0; which - using (7) and (8)
or Lemma 1 - requires a · p · b ¡ I · ¡p · ¡a; where the two inequalities in the
middle follow from the assumption that the …xed point is unique: The outside inequalities
come from using px · wax: A second, interior equilibrium under price p0 requires p0 = a
and b ¡ I > maxfp0;¡p0g: These requirements are inconsistent with the corner equilibrium:
When a > 0; the corner equilibrium implies b ¡ I < 0; while the interior equilibrium calls
for b ¡I > 0: Similarly, when a < 0 the interior equilibrium requires b ¡I ¸ ¡p0 = ¡a > 0;
a contradiction.
The last step is to consider the other corner equilibrium, ¸ = 1; as a second equilibrium
besides ¸ = 0: Lemma 1 implies ¡a · ¡p0 · b ¡ I · p0 · a, if it is to be unique given p0:
This contradicts the assumption that ¸ = 0 is an equilibrium however. ¥
Lemmas 1 and 2 now give immediately the …rst main result by setting pA = a.
Proposition 1. An autarky equilibrium exists for pA = a and has the following properties:









(b) If b ¡ I · maxfa;¡ag, the equilibrium is stable and Home is culturally homogenous.
(b1) The equilibrium is unique if minfa;¡ag · b¡I · maxfa;¡ag: Home is culturally
homogenous in x (b ¸
A
= 1) if a > 0; and homogenous in y (b ¸
A
= 0) if a < 0.
(b2) There exist two equilibria, in which Home is culturally homogenous in x or y if
b ¡ I < minfa;¡ag:
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 3 for the case where a > 0: Depending on the
value of b¡I relative to a; the autarky equilibrium is unique or not, and is either culturally
diverse or homogenous. Cultural diversity is more likely the larger the di¤erence between
the preference parameter for the person with the highest taste for good x (b) and the value of
the identity loss parameter (I), holding technology constant. A similar …gure applies when
a < 0: In this case the only di¤erence is that the middle segment of Figure 3 is replaced
by a unique equilibrium in which the country is homogenous in good y, that is, b ¸ = 0: The
comparative statics of b ¸
A
with respect to b and I depend on the sign of a; whose sign is
determined by the absolute di¤erence in unit labor coe¢cients of x and y.
For later comparison it is useful to write down equilibrium autarky utility levels condi-













+ e I ¡ b ¸
A
I;
where A denotes autarky values, and b ¸
A
follows from Proposition 1. Note that uA(y) is
independent of b:
3.2 Free Trade
Recall that Foreign is identical to Home except for technology parameters. Thus I = I¤;b =
b
¤














This assumption narrows down the trading structure, without …xing it entirely. Condition
(12) implies that under free trade Home produces and exports good x, while Foreign produces
and exports good y; if all goods are consumed (recall that both countries must produce the
noncultural good): Any other ordering of labor coe¢cients than (12) would open up the
possibility that a country exports both x and y, something that appears less interesting
for the present purpose. The assumption is also consistent with a situation in which each
cultural good can be produced only in one country, say French wine in France or Hollywood
movies in the U.S., which can be formalized by assuming that ay and a¤
x go toward in…nity.






























z = a¤: Foreign’s autarky
equilibrium has the same qualitative structure as the one given in Proposition 1. Depending
on the sign of a¤, however, the range of values for b ¡ I under which the foreign economy is
culturally diverse, can be larger or smaller. For example, if a > a¤ > 0; Foreign is diverse
for a larger set of values of b ¡ I: The reverse is true, however, if ¡a¤ > a > 0 > ¡a > a¤:
The de…nition of a free trade equilibrium follows now the one under autarky with the dif-
ference that goods markets are integrated (while labor markets stay national) and consumers
in both countries maximize utility given their national parameter ¸ and ¸
¤ respectively: The
critical value b ¸ has the same structure as in (9), assuming an interior solution, although now
relating to the free trade price pT: In the following I use superscript T to indicate free trade
values (as opposed to A for autarky). Also I normalize the price of the composite good to
one, pT
z = 1:
Some preliminary insights are straightforward. With the price normalization, the free













if all goods are produced in equilibrium. Since in this situation both countries can serve the
maximum world demand for either cultural good, wages can be deduced from marginal cost
pricing in the noncultural good production, that is, w¤T = 1=a¤
z and wT = 1=az: The free










´ e a; (14)
where e a re‡ects the price di¤erence of cultural goods in terms of the composite good, when
countries produce according to their comparative advantage. In (14) it is assumed that all
goods are produced in equilibrium. Similar to Lemma 2 for autarky, however, nothing is
lost by assuming that the price under free trade is given by (14) even when the world is
culturally homogenous under free trade.
It is now easy to see that condition (12) implies a > e a > a¤:
Countries are symmetric except for technology and thus have the same consumption
pattern. The utility maximizing choice in both countries is still governed by (5), and similarly
the aggregate demand condition is given by (6). This implies that if a …xed point ¸
T for
Home exists given p, it exists in both countries. Standard arguments then ensure a free trade
equilibrium.
Proposition 2. In a free trade equilibrium pT = e a:









b) If b¡I · maxfe a;¡e ag; the world is culturally homogenous. The equilibrium is unique
if minfe a;¡e ag · b¡I · maxfe a;¡e ag: The world is culturally homogenous in x (b ¸
T
= 1)
if e a > 0; and homogenous in y (b ¸
T
= 0) if e a < 0. There exist two equilibria, in which
the world is culturally homogenous in x or y if b ¡ I < minfe a;¡e ag:
Proof: Follows proof of Prop. 1 by replacing a with e a: ¥

















+ e I ¡ b ¸
T
I:
Conditional on consuming x; autarky and free trade utility di¤er only by the loss in identity.
When consuming y under free trade; consumption of the noncultural good changes as well.
16Individuals may switch cultural good consumption, something that is considered in more
detail below.
4 Welfare E¤ects of Trade Liberalization
This section compares autarky and free trade and thus provides an assessment of the welfare
e¤ects of trade liberalization. As a …rst step it is helpful to compare society’s consumption
pattern in the two situations.




; then countries cannot be culturally diverse under autarky. More-
over, the cultural consumption pattern under free trade is bounded by the consumption













2 (0;1); where the values of the consumption patterns are given
by (9) with pA = a = a¤ = p¤A: But this contradicts (12), as shown above.
The consumption pattern must be the same for both countries under free trade. Be-
cause countries are symmetric except for technology, and there are no frictions in trade,
all consumers face the same price vector and thus consumers with identical preferences in
both countries make the same consumption decision. Therefore, under trade the fraction of















< 1 when b ¸
A
> 0 because pT = e a < a = pA. Lastly, assume
b ¸
A
= 0; which implies 1 + pA=(b ¡ I) · 0: It is now impossible that b ¸
T
> 0 because the
latter implies 1 + pT=(b ¡ I) > 0: Jointly with the previous inequality, I get pT ¡ pA > 0; a
contradiction.





Lemma 3 is useful because it allows us to make predictions about how the pattern of
cultural consumption changes qualitatively when moving from autarky to free trade. For
welfare evaluation we can distinguish three potential groups at Home (although not all
three are always relevant): Those who consume good x under trade and autarky, those who
consume good y under both regimes, and those who switch from x to y (the ”switchers”).
17No consumer at Home switches from consuming good y to good x; given the assumption on












by Lemma 3: When an individual prefers good y
under autarky, so it must under trade. The reverse is not true.
For each of the three potential cases the utility di¤erence is
u
T(x;b) ¡ u





















)I > 0 (16)
u
T(y) ¡ u





Several insights follow immediately. Individuals who under both regimes consume good x
cannot gain from trade, and lose if some people switch from x to y: Intuitively, Home is
the cheapest source of producing good x and trade only could change society’s consumption
pattern away from this good. By contrast, therefore, individuals who consume y under both
situations must gain for two reasons. One is the traditional source of the gains from trade,
as Foreign can produce good y more cheaply. In addition such consumers potentially gain
from the favorable change in society’s consumption pattern toward their preferred cultural
good. Regarding the last group, the switchers from x to y, the welfare change is not clear
immediately. Similarly, the utility di¤erentials for foreign consumers are
u
¤T(y) ¡ u





















)I > 0 (17)
u
¤T(x;b) ¡ u





The last line gives the utility change for switchers from y to x. No individual in Foreign
switches in the opposite direction.
18Proposition 3. Free trade is not Pareto inferior to autarky if the free trade equilibrium is
unique.
Proof: It is su¢cient to show that at least one consumer gains. This is the case when there
are y consumers at Home under autarky and trade (see 16), or when there exists a consumer





) 2 (0;1) by Lemma 3.
A similar argument applies when only one country is culturally diverse under autarky,
say b ¸
A
= 1 > b ¸
¤A
> 0. Foreign x consumers under trade and autarky always gain. For the
same reason Home y consumers gain when only Foreign is homogenous under autarky.
Next assume both countries are culturally homogenous under autarky, but in di¤erent
goods, that is b ¸
¤A
= 0 and b ¸
A
= 1: If 0 < b ¸
T
< 1; the utility change for the switcher at
Home with the lowest preference for good x, b = ¡b; is
u
T(y) ¡ u
A(x;¡b) = ¡e a + b ¡ b ¸
T
I > 0;
which must be positive by the condition that the world is diverse under free trade (Prop.
2). When b ¸
T
= 1; some switchers in Foreign gain as the utility change for the person with
highest preference for good x has utility change
u
¤T(x;b) ¡ u
¤A(y) = e a + b > 0
because e a > 0 by Proposition 2 when the equilibrium is unique. A similar argument applies
when b ¸
T
= 0 instead of b ¸
T
= 1.
Finally, if both countries are homogenous in the same good under autarky, the traditional
gains from trade argument holds. ¥
An intuitive way to understand Proposition 3 is to note that for consumers who consume
the same set of goods under both trade and autarky consumption of good z cannot decline.
It is clear then that if the world is culturally diverse under both regimes somebody must be
better o¤. The only problem could arise when a good is not consumed in either autarky or
trade. Uniqueness of the free trade equilibrium is su¢cient to make somebody better o¤.
19The case where the free trade equilibrium is not unique plays a role further down. The next
result sheds light on the question whether trade is Pareto superior.
Proposition 4. a) If the world is culturally diverse under free trade; trade is not Pareto
superior to autarky. b) If the world is culturally homogenous under free trade; trade is
Pareto superior to autarky for some parameter values.
Proof: a) Follows immediately from Lemma 3 and utility comparison for both Home and
Foreign (see 16 and 17) if b ¸
T
2 (0;1). b) Assume the world is culturally homogenous under
free trade, say b ¸
T
= 0: From Lemma 3 follows b ¸
¤A
= 0; and thus in Foreign all individuals
are indi¤erent between autarky and free trade. In Home, assume b ¸
A
2 (0;1) which requires
b ¡ I > maxfa;¡ag: There are no individuals who consume x under both regimes. Those
who consume y under both regimes are obviously better o¤ (see 16). It remains to be seen
whether all switchers are no worse o¤. Consider therefore the individual with type b = b
who has the smallest gain from switching cultural good consumption from x to y: The utility
change equals ¡e a ¡ b ¡ (b ¸
A
¡ 1)I; which is positive if b ¡ I < ¡e a ¡ b ¸
A
I: This must be
consistent with the assumption that Foreign and the world are homogenous in y; which
holds if b ¡ I < ¡a¤; where a¤ < 0 (by Prop. 1 applied to Foreign); and b ¡ I < ¡e a for
e a < 0 (by Prop. 2). Since e a > a¤; the binding assumption is simply that the utility change
is positive, that is b ¡ I < ¡e a ¡ b ¸
A
I < ¡e a < ¡a¤. Parameter values exist that ful…ll this
condition, as an example below further illustrates. ¥
Proposition 4 is perhaps surprising in several ways. Recall that in a standard Ricardian
model trade is always weakly Pareto superior. A country does not gain from free trade
relative to autarky if its terms of trade do not change. If this happens, however, then
the other country must have gained, assuming relative labor input coe¢cients di¤er across
countries. This is no longer the case once cultural identity is considered and the world is
culturally diverse under free trade. The latter means that some people consume the same
set of goods under autarky and trade. Opening up for trade then must imply an unfavorable
¸¡ shift for some individuals.
The second part of Proposition 4 is noteworthy as well. It should be emphasized that
the result holds only for some parameter values, but not in general. Intuitively, trade is
Pareto improving when one country is a ’little’ diverse in the closed economy, and the
20production of the ’minority’ cultural good is relatively costly. In the open economy those
’minority’ consumers can be attracted to buy the other cultural good if this is relatively
cheaply produced elsewhere. At the same time there is no longer a loss in cultural identity.
If su¢ciently large, these gains outweigh the loss from having a high preference for the
original ’minority’ cultural good.
As mentioned above, the following example illustrates the point.
Example 1. Let the parameter values be








b = 3;I = 2:
This gives a = ¡3=4;e a = ¡3=2 and a¤ = ¡2: Home consumes mostly y under autarky
as b ¸
A
= 1=8, while Foreign consumes only y (b ¸
¤A
= 0). Under free trade the world is
homogenous in y (b ¸
T
= 0): All conditions are satis…ed for Pareto improving trade because
¡a = 3=4 < b ¡ I = 1 < 5=4 = ¡e a ¡ b ¸
A
I < 3=2 = ¡e a < ¡a¤ = 2:
The previous results are concerned with a global comparison of autarky and free trade
in terms of the Pareto criterium. The last result focuses on the welfare e¤ects of complete
trade liberalization in one country.
Proposition 5. For some parameter values everybody in a country can lose from free trade.
Proof: Consider the following parameter values:
¡a < b ¡ I < ¡e a < 0:
The …rst inequality together with a > 0 implies that Home is homogenous in x under autarky
by Prop. 1. This equilibrium is unique. The second inequality together with e a > 0 implies
that free trade has two corner equilibria, in which the world is homogenous in either of the
cultural goods. Assume now that the world is homogenous in y under free trade. Then the
individual at Home with the lowest preference for good x (b = ¡b); i.e. the person who gains
the most from free trade among the switchers, has utility change
u
T(y) ¡ u
A(x;¡b) = ¡e a + b:
21The change is negative, and hence everybody at Home loses, if b < e a: Together with the
initial assumption above this requires b < e a < I¡ b and therefore b < I=2: ¥
Proposition 5 undermines some of the positive light shed on culturally homogenous equi-
libria under free trade as given in the previous result. Note the di¤erence here though. The
example underlying Proposition 5 is based on corner equilibria under autarky and free trade
(b¡I < 0). There is no loss in identity under both regimes. The problem arises because of a
coordination failure when multiple equilibria exist under free trade. By contrast, the Pareto
improvement in Prop. 4 is partly driven by the gains from eliminating identity losses, which
required b ¡ I > 0 for the country that is diverse under autarky.
The scenario described above can also make free trade Pareto worse than autarky if




= 0: While in Home everybody is worse
o¤ under free trade, the above parameter values imply that all individuals in Foreign are
indi¤erent between autarky and free trade. Clearly, the multiplicity of equilibrium under
free trade is an essential part of the result, because otherwise it would contradict Proposition
3.
5 Extensions and Discussion
The model can easily be extended to handle additional issues, some of which are discussed
now.
Country Size Di¤erences
So far I assumed that countries are symmetric except for technology, which in particular
meant that countries are symmetric in population size. One advantage of this formulation
is that results are not driven by country size e¤ects. Note, however, that di¤erences in
population size have no directe¤ect under certain conditions. For example, assuming that the
taste distribution is the same in both countries, the properties of the autarky equilibrium are
invariant to country size. This can be seen from condition (6) for the …xed point requirement.
Country size would enter multiplicative on both sides and thus simply cancels out. In the
open economy country size typically doesn’t matter as well because the consumption pattern
in both countries continues to be the same. This could change if a country becomes too small
22to serve a particular cultural good to the entire world. Opening up for trade may lead to a
di¤erent pattern of specialization than the one that would otherwise occur.
Asymmetric Taste Distributions
Similar to di¤erences in country size one can introduce di¤erences in the distribution of
the parameter b. Comparative statics for the maximum preference for good x; b, is easily done
for the closed economy. A decrease in b while holding technology parameters constant makes
it more likely that the country is culturally homogenous under autarky. This can be seen from
Figure 3. In the open economy consumption patterns across countries will typically di¤er
now (unless both countries are homogenous). Intuitively, however, the properties of Lemma
3, showing that the consumption patterns are bounded by the autarky patterns should still
be true. Nevertheless it would be interesting to extend the model in this direction to examine
how the gains or losses from trade are a¤ected.
The Process of Identi…cation
As mentioned in the introduction, the concept of identity used in the present paper is
very rudimentary. Psychologists emphasize the process of identi…cation by which they mean
that individuals may engage in activities to rea¢rm their values if others violate them. For
example, if the social norm is to consume good x, a x consumer may undertake an activity
against a y consumer, which is costly to the latter. The execution of such action is costly
to the x consumer as well, but the bene…t is that through this action she avoids the loss of
identity. Depending on the size of the costs and losses, the process of identi…cation takes place
or not. Incorporating such behavior into the present model is possible in principle, although
it might lead to more complex solutions. One bene…t of such an extension is, however, that
the interaction among individuals is no longer a simple consumption externality as in the
present form. Opening up markets for international trade may now change not only the
pattern of consumption in society but also the magnitude of retaliation (identi…cation).
International Consumption Links
Another avenue for future work is to link the consumption behavior internationally. In
the present model an individual’s cultural consumption decision depends on prices and the
consumption behavior in the rest of the own country. In reality there are many examples
23where individual consumption behavior is driven by foreign consumption patterns. For
example, teenagers around the world copy consumption patterns from teenagers and/or
athletes in the U.S. This could be incorporated into the model fairly easily by interpreting
¸ as the fraction of the world population that consumes good x. As long as countries
are symmetric in size and taste distribution, this modi…cation should not change any of
the results because countries have symmetric consumption patterns in the present model.
Results could change once countries were allowed to di¤er on any other dimension than
technology.
Government Internvention
Until now I assumed that governments do not interfere. This might be considered unre-
alistic for several reasons. Due to the consumption externality even the autarky equilibrium
is likely to be not …rst-best e¢cient.12 In addition, opening borders up for trade will often
produce gainers and losers, in particular if the country is culturally diverse both under au-
tarky and free trade. Similar to traditional models of international trade where distributional
e¤ects within a country are operative we should expect political pressure to occur. Consider
therefore speci…c taxes as government instrument. A uniform tax on cultural goods does not
change the results of the paper qualitatively as it has no e¤ect on the individual’s decision
which cultural good to consume. By contrast, a di¤erential tax on one cultural good, say in
the form of a tari¤ on the imported cultural good, does change the cultural consumption pat-
tern in society. One way to think about such an extension is to view the tari¤ as a worsening
of the e¢ciency of producing the particular good abroad. This discourages consumption of
the good domestically, and reduces the gain of those consumers who nevertheless prefer it.
A su¢ciently high tari¤, of course, eventually eliminates imports, although not necessarily
the consumption of the good unless the domestically produced version is also heavily taxed.
12To verify this statement is not trivial however. If the autarky equilibrium is ine¢cient, it is not clear
whether a Pareto-improving tax/transfer scheme could be implemented under the assumption that the taste
parameter b is not observable. In this situation taxes or transfers can be conditioned only on the type of
cultural good consumed, which will tend to limit the governments ability to implement desired outcomes.
246 Conclusion
This paper has developed a simple model of international trade in cultural products. In
contrast to the new trade theory or other models of trade in cultural goods, this paper
does not rely on increasing returns to scale on the production side of the economy or on
country size di¤erences. Cultural goods di¤er from other goods in that they create an
interdependence among individual consumption decisions, like a network externality, and
thus generate cultural identity. This modeling approach seems a natural way of introducing
cultural goods, and is based on ideas in sociology and psychology, as explained in Akerlof
and Kranton (2000). From a modeling point of view, the interdependence of individual
consumption decisions is similar to increasing returns to scale in the new trade theory (see
Krugman (1979) and Ethier (1982) for early contributions in this area). In the latter higher
output decreases average costs and hence price, and therefore makes it even more attractive
for consumers to purchase the good. Here, the more consumers buy the same good the
lower is the loss in identity for existing consumers and the more attractive becomes the
consumption of such good for other consumers.
The present paper shifts the attention away from the production side to the consumer side
of the economy. This becomes clear when the distributional e¤ects of trade liberalization
are considered. In a Heckscher-Ohlin model the factor that is used in intensively in the
production of the export good gains while the factor used intensively in the import good
loses when trade is liberalized. By contrast, in the present model gainers are those indiviudals
who consume the import good both under autarky and free trade. Individuals who consume
the cultural good exported under free trade tend to lose.
An important feature of the model in this paper is that cultural diversity has no value in
itself, but rather implies losses in identity that must be worthwhile for some given their taste
preference. This feature could be challenged by those who believe that cultural diversity,
similar to biological diversity, is a positive value in itself. For example, even if a person
consumes only a particular cultural good, the person may put a large value on the option
to consume other cultural goods. The present analysis has not paid any attention to such a
positive option value, something that should be explored in the future.
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